

ATTACHMENT TO EVALUATION, MIDDLE EASTERN THEATRE

2 November, 1942

It is clear that a Nazi decision against the Red Army must await another hard Russian winter. Not since May 1941 at Crete has Hitler been able to dazzle his people with a brilliant, inexpensive victory.

Hitler can ill afford not to exploit his gains of last June against the British Eighth Army. By taking Middle East, Hitler denies the Red Army Allied supplies from Basra; he isolates India, gains Persian oil, interrupts our Ferry Route. Destruction of the Eighth Army gives Hitler Mediterranean domination, relegates Great Britain to a defensive role of the United Kingdom; it frees Hitler to turn his attention to West Africa. A decisive victory in Middle East will serve as an opiate for the German people throughout the winter of '42-43.

But a reinforced Eighth Army and an RAF bolstered by United States bombers and fighters offer sufficient power to force Rommel into a major effort to take the Middle East. With his Russian front dug in for the winter Hitler will find no difficulty in allocating to Rommel the means necessary to destroy the Eighth Army.

Rommel's supply problem, however, will be enormous. With roughly a hundred American bombers, Axis shipping losses in the Mediterranean have risen from eleven per cent to between 40 to 50 per cent. Were we to send three or four hundred heavy bombers to Middle East, Rommel's supplies would dry up like a fig.

✓ Middle East is pre-eminently an air theatre; its possibilities should be exploited to the limit. Due to unfavorable weather, heavy bombers are rather ineffective during winter in England. But in Middle East, winter weather is ideal for bombing over the Mediterranean. By all means our American Air Command in Middle East should be allocated as many heavy bombers as are necessary for the winter season.

In the meanwhile, we should send, without delay, sufficient American troops and equipment to guarantee the security of Middle East. We should provide units of Allied troops - Greeks, Poles, Free French, Yugoslavs, Czechs - in Middle East with adequate equipment.

- 2 -

In the spring of 1943, should Hitler assume the defensive against the USSR, his military conquest of Europe may be considered complete. His eastern front will then extend from Murmansk to Caucasus; his southern flank from Caucasus to the Pyrenees; his sea front from the Bay of Biscay to Murmansk. At all costs, Hitler must be contained in this dangerous triangle.

The United Nations must seize and build without delay a series of impregnable strategic areas south of Hitler's southern flank. Once we have secured these strategic areas in North Africa and the Middle East, we will have a chain of force 6,000 miles long around Hitler in Europe.

The United Kingdom is the anchor link of this chain; United Nations' naval and air units on the Atlantic and in the North Sea pull this chain taut. If strong, this chain of force will hold Hitler in Europe. Not to put pressure on him, the chain must be tightened.

Shrinking of this chain lifts it north from Africa, clears an east-west passage through the Mediterranean; it makes available a ring of air bases about Germany from which converging bombing attacks may be sent against the heart of industrial Germany; it secures bases from which the Aegean and Greece can be bombed until untenable; it provides bases from which Hitler's communications to the south Russian front may be interrupted. From attainable bases in the Mediterranean, Italy can be bombed into demoralization and Mussolini's fleet, his last remaining asset, can be pounded into junk. Shrinking of the chain about Hitler in Europe offers our best, certain means of applying effective pressure on Germany in our initial major effort.

From Tunisia it will be possible to occupy Sardinia and Sicily. Should we guarantee the territorial integrity of Turkey at the peace conference, should the United Nations place sufficient power south of Turkey, the chances are Turkey will permit our intervention. If she refuses, intervention must be made anyway.

Regardless of the method employed, air bases in Turkey must be made available to the United Nations. From Iraq the Red Army in Caucasus must be strengthened so as to make our oil supply in the Tigris and Euphrates Basin and Persian Gulf bases secure. From Iran communication lines, protected on the west by the Caspian Sea, must be extended north into the USSR. At all costs the Red Army must be kept fighting.

When this chain of force about Hitler in Europe is tightened, he must then distribute his fighter aircraft, his anti-aircraft, his artillery, and his best combat divisions over the 6,000 mile Germanish, Caspian, Pyrenees, Atlantic, North Sea, Norwegian Fronts. Due to extreme length of these fronts and because pressure, or threatened pressure, can be exerted all along the lines, Hitler will have insufficient strength to dispose his divisions so as to meet effectively all possible invasion threats. Consequently, he will be forced to resort either to a cordon defense or to amass strength in selected strategic locations and leave other portions of his enormous front lightly held. Since, at least in some places, Hitler's defenses of necessity must be thin, the Allied Nations can seize the initiative, an appropriate area can be selected where we will be able to amass superior force against enemy weakness. At some place, invasion of Europe will be indicated.

There is another advantage in containing Hitler in Europe and in exerting pressure all along the chain of force which surrounds him. It will give hope to the oppressed nationals of Europe and prevent Hitler from assimilating the indigestible peoples of the conquered countries. More and more Nazi combat divisions will have to be distributed among the oppressed peoples to hold them in a strait jacket.

Once our chain of force contains Hitler tightly in Europe, we shall be able to develop rail communications in North Africa, to establish east-west traffic in the Mediterranean and by routes east of the Caspian to extend our supply communications into Russia. Pressure on Hitler in Europe, the opening of a great front from North Africa, increased supplies to the Red Army will keep Russia in the war. And Russia must be kept in the war to secure victory on terms acceptable to the American people.

The objection to the Middle East theatre is the difficulty of supply. There are favorable supply aspects:

- (1) Half the supplies necessary for desert warfare are gas and oil; in Middle East these are available locally. Middle East is the only remaining source of oil available to the United Nations outside the Western Hemisphere.
- (2) To shift the stress of the American main effort from United Kingdom to Africa will release some tonnage from the North Atlantic.

- (5) At no time in the past two years has Hitler been able to allocate as many as a thousand aircraft to the Mediterranean area; next year, if we push our North African plan, Hitler can place less rather than more than a thousand aircraft in this theatre. Consequently, the United Nations can dominate the sky over the Mediterranean. With this Mediterranean air superiority established, ships no longer need make the long trip around the southern African cape to reach the Middle East. By restoration of east-west shipping in the Mediterranean, present tonnage requirements for Middle East and USSR can be cut about seventy-five per cent.

It is, therefore, clear that the seemingly difficult supply problem for major operations in North Africa must no longer be allowed to preclude realization of the launching of major operations from this theatre.

Recommendations:

That without delay the United States stiffen its air and land forces in the Middle East so as to guarantee the security of this theatre.

That the War Department, by mutual agreement with our Allies, determine its appropriate share of strategic bases in the Middle East and North Africa.

That these bases be made impregnable without delay.

That the bases once secure be used as springboards for tightening the chain of steel about Hitler in Europe.

Bonner F. Fellers
BONNER F. FELLERS,
Colonel, G.S.C.

November 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STAFF

Our enemies are: Japan, Germany, and Italy.

The most effective action against Japan would be an expedition from Seattle to some strategic base within striking distance of Japan to shipping and industrial centers. Such an expedition requires more ships than we have. The only other available approach to Japan is from Australia. This is also a long and difficult operation. At present, this operation will not be attempted.

If our major initial effort is not against Japan, there remains Germany and Italy. Germany might be invaded from England. A base in the United Kingdom affords a direct route across the Atlantic and to the heart of industrial Germany.

But there are disadvantages to invasion of Europe from England. Since Russia and the independent nations of Europe, including the United Kingdom, the British are defense minded. England is too small to offer adequate facilities for the four or five millions of men and the tremendous amount of supplies and material necessary to launch a successful invasion of Europe. Air force launched from England must change in its attack against the Continent. On the other hand, German air attacks cover us on a crowded England. Executive losses at Europe have little tendency to almost insurmountable difficulties of a landing operation. After landings are effected, our forces must reduce field fortifications, defeat large ground and air forces. A second front in France will be tactically costly and slow. It may not be attempted. Consequently, American troops in the United Kingdom may be forced to play a defensive role only.

Our initial major land operations, of necessity, may be relegated to the Pacific East. Eventually the United Nations may be forced to establish a line of strategic centers from French Morocco to India.

So as to contain Hitler in Europe, strategic areas which stand to make irreplaceable contributions to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, Spain, French Guiana, Brazil, Argentina, Rio de Janeiro, Chile, and Alaska.

Following the military conquest of the Southwest, Hitler will attempt to justify the conquest of Europe and establish economic and political domination of Europe. Hitler's efforts have been such to deprive Europe of its resources. These efforts will be continued until the arrival of the Allies. As forces and supplies arrive, invasion into Italy, the Balkans and Germany is possible. From these and Alaska, food and supplies can be sent into the U.S.A., from Alaska, relief can be sent to China.

Although supply of these strategic areas is almost impossible, successful prosecution of the war leads us to common sense. They are these strategic areas it is possible to secure valuable military intelligence from Europe; from them information essential for long-range planning can be secured.

Conclusion:

That the initial American effort will be made in Middle East is a strong probability.

Recommendation:

That the War Department at once establish appropriate intelligence agencies in these critical areas so that our Planning Divisions may be provided ample reliable information.

ROBERT F. FRIEDMAN,
Colonel, U.S.A.

Dear Colonel Danovani

Since you have always been most cooperative in Cairo and Washington, I am taking the liberty again to give you some studies related to the Middle East.

There are two other suggestions I should like to advance:

a. After two years observation in Middle East, during which time I was in daily contact with the British, I am convinced that under no circumstances should British and American forces operate in the same theatre of war.

b. I am concerned lest our progress in the development of aircraft types may be stifled by the Navy. It has finally become clear that without adequate fighter protection fleets cannot exist even within range of enemy air forces. The natural tendency therefore will be for the Navy to build a vast air force whose real purpose is merely to protect their fleet. To be ever present with the fleet, their aircraft must be carrier-based. But carrier based planes are of necessity inferior to land based planes. The Navy therefore may demand of our industry a vast number of carrier based types - thereby "flooding up" an enormous number of planes of inferior types.

In plain language, this means the Navy will be inclined to build an air force whose mission it is to protect the fleet rather than to strike the enemy.

Since our losses in aircraft carriers clearly indicate the carrier is too vulnerable to be reliable, it is submitted that the general trend of our aircraft design should be toward long range land based fighters and bombers rather than toward carrier-based aircraft.

A solution might be joint Army-Navy planning. But eventually this problem of air objectives will lead to a separate air force.

My experience in the Libyan Desert leads me to be unalterably in favor of Unity of Command over air and ground troops.

I see no objection.

A separate air force was an indispensable element that of striking strategic targets which was achieving the objective of our fleet for our armed forces. A separate air force should lend itself to the development of planes with the highest possible performance characteristics.

This note does not necessarily indicate a commitment
air force, but rather is intended to invite your attention
to a pitfall into which we may stumble in the development
of aircraft types.

[Illegible handwritten notes]

ROBERT A. HARRIS
Colonel, U.S.A.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

ATTORNEY TO REINFORCE MIDDLE EASTERN FRONT

2 November, 1942

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Hitler can ill afford not to exploit his gains of last June against the British Eighth Army. By taking Middle East, Hitler denies the Red Army Allied supplies from Egypt; he isolates India, gains Persian oil, interrupts and severs routes. Destruction of the Eighth Army gives Hitler Mediterranean domination, relegates Great Britain to a defensive role of the United Kingdom; it forces Hitler to turn his attention to West Africa. A decisive victory in Middle East will serve as an opiate for the German people throughout the winter of '42-43.

But a reinforced Eighth Army and an RAF bolstered by United States bombers and fighters offer sufficient power to force Rommel into a major effort to take the Middle East. With his Russian front dug in for the winter Hitler will find no difficulty in allocating to Rommel the means necessary to destroy the Eighth Army.

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In the meanwhile, we should send, without delay, sufficient American troops and equipment to guarantee the security of Middle East. We should provide units of Allied troops - Greeks, Poles, Free French, Yugoslavs, Czechs - in Middle East with adequate equipment.

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Shrinking of this chain lifts it north from Africa, clears an east-west passage through the Mediterranean; it makes available a ring of air bases about Germany from which converging bombing attacks may be sent against the heart of industrial Germany; it secures bases from which the Aegean and Greece can be bombed until untenable; it provides bases from which Hitler's communications to the south Russian front may be interrupted. From attainable bases in the Mediterranean, Italy can be bombed into demoralization and Mussolini's fleet, his last remaining asset, can be pounded into junk. Shrinking of the chain about Hitler in Europe offers our best, certain means of applying effective pressure on Germany in our initial major effort.

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There is another advantage in containing Hitler in Europe and in exerting pressure all along the chain of force which surrounds him. It will give hope to the oppressed nationalities of Europe and prevent Hitler from assimilating the indigestible peoples of the conquered countries. More and more East combat divisions will have to be distributed among the oppressed peoples to hold them in a strait jacket.

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- (2) To shift the stress of the American main effort from United Kingdom to Africa will release some tonnage from the North Atlantic.

- (3) At no time in the past two years has Hitler been able to allocate as many as a thousand aircraft to the Mediterranean area; and yet, if we look at our North African plan, Hitler has given less rather than more than a thousand aircraft to this theatre. Consequently, the United Nations can dominate the sky over the Mediterranean. With this Mediterranean air superiority established, ships no longer need the land help against the southern African base to reach the Middle East. By restoration of east-west shipping in the Mediterranean, present tonnage requirements for Middle East and USSR can be cut about seventy-five per cent.

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BONNIE F. FELLEUS,
Colonel, U.S.A.

Belgrade, January 1943
Received
1/25/43
1/25/43
1/25/43

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 25, 1943

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Because I did not feel personally qualified to analyze Russian racial traits, I omitted an important element from my estimate of the situation handed to you yesterday. There is, however, a disturbing element which I feel is very damaging.

While in Cairo I grew to know most intimately Colonel Jarko Popovitch, a Slav who was formerly Head of the Intelligence Division of the Yugoslav Army. At the time of Germany's invasion of Yugoslavia, Popovitch was Military Attache in Moscow. He came to Cairo in June 1941 where he predicted the Red Army would not be defeated. My cables and reports from Cairo, which claimed the Red Army would hold, were to a great degree influenced by Popovitch's estimates. I know Popovitch to be a brilliant officer, and our War Department places great credence to his statements. Popovitch was educated in Russia, knows Stalin personally and intimately. In my opinion he knows more about the Red Army than any other person outside U.S.S.R.

Popovitch claims that the emotional Slavic temperament has neither the stability nor the steadfastness of purpose which is to be found in that of the Teuton and Anglo-Saxon. He feels that temperamentally the Slav is incapable of the intense, sustained effort demanded by a prolonged war; that if the Nazi pressure on the Red Army is not alleviated by successes or allied intervention, for temperamental reasons alone the Red Army will not resist beyond the Winters of 1943 and 1944.

We must remember that in 1905 the Russian Army had many fresh troops which had not been in action when it surrendered to a Japanese army which was exhausted. The Russian Army also quit in 1917 and, although the Revolution was a direct cause, the Slavic temperament unquestionably had a great deal to do with the willingness to stop fighting.

Although racial temperament is an intangible,

we can ill afford not to give great weight to the thorough
evaluation.

Respectfully yours,


Bonner P. Fellers
Brigadier General, USA

Philippines
50318
Japan
Manila
Dr. H. H. ...

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 8, 1945

February 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM

Re: ...
of 17 May ...

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: Bonner F. Pellers, Brig. General, USA

The recent speech of Tojo promising independence to the Philippines and Burma may lead to grave consequences. Due to their intense hatred for the British, the Burmese are likely to accept this independence and fight with the Japanese against the white man. President Quezon himself is deeply disturbed; he is anxious to communicate with the Filipinos by radio and to ascertain their reactions. He is fearful lest they be misled by this Japanese promise.

From the beginning, the Japanese have been extremely clever in their methods of Philippine occupation. They brought with them Japanese Catholic Priests. The Catholic religion, which is very dear to the Filipino, is not being disturbed. During the heavy attacks against Corregidor, Filipinos from Occupied Manila came to Corregidor and disclosed to President Quezon that the Japanese claimed positive information that the American had no intention of sending help to the Philippines. This the Filipinos did not then believe, but, nevertheless, it proved to be true.

The Japanese can now appeal to the Filipinos by saying that we not only allowed them to go down in defeat without making any effort to reinforce them, but, at the same time, we sent troops and supplies to Britain and Ireland where they were not desperately needed. Unquestionably, the Japanese have made a strong appeal and these facts, coupled with the imperialistic threat of the white man, may induce Filipinos to toy with Japanese promises.

Claiming they came to the Philippines to liberate the Filipino from the White Peril, the Japanese unquestionably will demand and build strong air and naval bases. In a short time their position in the Philippines will be very strong.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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- 2 -

Our Present position in China is none too good. The recent Casablanca Conference, in which neither Chiang Kai-Shek nor Stalin participated, strengthens still further the Japanese claim that we have deserted our allies in the Orient.

If we allow our pledge to the Philippines to lie dormant until the European War is over, we may face a Philippine population which has lost considerable of its zest for American control. Conceivably, some Filipinos would fight with Japan and a greater number might remain neutral.

Since it appears our major military effort initially will be in Europe, except for the Southwest Pacific Theatre, psychological warfare for a time may prove to be our only weapon in the Orient.

This problem is of paramount national importance. It jeopardizes our position in the Orient both during the war and the peace which follows. President Quezon is seeing President Roosevelt at once and will present the strongest possible appeal for assistance.

It is urgently recommended that your schedule for establishing communications with the Philippines be given first priority.

677
B. F. F.

To: JCS

Fellers, Bonner, 10, 305
10, 305
Independence
Japan
Propaganda

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 2, 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: Bonner F. Fellers, Brig. General, USA

The recent speech of Tojo promising independence to the Philippines and Burma may lead to grave consequences. Due to their intense hatred for the British, the Burmese will accept this independence and will fight with the Japanese against the white man. President Quezon himself is deeply disturbed; he is anxious to communicate with the Filipinos by radio and to ascertain their reactions. He is fearful lest they be misled by this Japanese promise.

From the beginning, the Japanese have been extremely clever in their methods of Philippine occupation. They brought with them Japanese Catholic Priests. The Catholic religion, which is very dear to the Filipino, is not being disturbed. During the heavy attacks against Corregidor, Japanese from Occupied Manila came to Corregidor and disclosed to President Quezon that the Japanese claimed positive information that the American had no intention of intervening in the Philippines. This the Filipino did not then believe, but, nevertheless, it proved to be true.

The Japanese can now appeal to the Filipino by saying that we not only allowed them to go down in defeat without making any effort to support them, but, at the same time, we sent troops and supplies to Britain and Ireland where they were not desperately needed. Unquestionably, the Japanese have made a strong appeal and these facts, coupled with the imperialistic threat of the white man, may cause loyal Filipinos to toy with Japanese promises.

The Japanese now claim they came to the Philippines to liberate the Filipino from the White Peril. In return for this liberation they unquestionably will demand air and naval bases. In a short time their position in the Philippines will be very strong.

- 2 -

Our present position in China is none too good. The recent Casablanca Conference, in which neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Stalin participated, strengthens still further the Japanese claim that we have deserted our allies in the Orient.

If we allow our pledge to the Filipino to lie dormant until the European War is over, we may face a Philippine population which has lost considerable of its zest for American control. Conceivably, some Filipinos would fight with Japan and a greater number might remain neutral.

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It is urgently recommended that your schedule for establishing communications with the Philippines be given first priority.

B. P. P.

February 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: Senator F. Pollers, Brig. General, USA

The recent speech of Tojo promising independence to the Philippines and Japan may lead to grave consequences. Due to their intense hatred for the British, the Japanese will accept this independence and will fight with the Japanese against the white man. President Quezon himself is deeply disturbed; he is anxious to communicate with the Philippines by radio and to ascertain their reactions. He is fearful lest they be misled by this Japanese promise.

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- 1 -

Our present position in China is now too good. The recent Casablanca Conference, in which neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Stalin participated, strengthens still further the Japanese claim that we have deserted our allies in the Orient.

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D. P. P.

RPT:ANE



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12, 102
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 August 1946

Dear General Donovan:

Glad you are back!

The attached studies will give you a rough approximation of my misspent life while you were away.

Respectfully,

Samuel F. Pollers
Samuel F. Pollers

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures

SECRETNOTES ONTHE GERMAN MOSCOW MANIFESTO

OF 21 JULY 1943.

Possibilities of a Separate Peace.

The Moscow Manifesto is a slick document. Whether implemented or repudiated, it must be considered as a Stalin peace gesture.

A separate peace by U.S.S.R. is possible.

Soviet losses may have reached twenty five million, one third of which were soldiers.

Russians are war weary, psychologically ripe for peace.

The Soviet food and industrial situation is critical.

A separate peace would foster Soviet influence in central Europe and the Balkans.

Carpathian frontiers would put Stalin in position to control Romanian oil; the fertile Ukraine would be returned.

The U.S.S.R. resents Anglo-American interference in central Europe.

Stalin may feel justified in making a separate peace because Anglo-American pledges for a 1943 major invasion were repudiated at the last Washington conference.

Aspects of Moscow Manifesto favorable to Germany are:

Strength from Eastern Front is needed to meet the ever increasing Anglo-American pressure and to replace Italian units in France and the Balkans.

Peace with U.S.S.R. would offset the blow dealt German morale by the unexpected fall of Mussolini which placed heavy stress on Hitler's position.

German peace-time economy complements that of the U.S.S.R.

Although Germany is still capable of terrific retaliatory measures, continuation of Eastern Front means eventual German defeat and dismemberment.

Consequences of a Separate Peace.

The danger in the Moscow Manifesto lies in the fact that its terms are more attractive than those yet offered by the United Nations.

We have demanded unconditional surrender, we have made promises to oppressed peoples.**

Peace with the U.S.S.R. would release 300 German Divisions from the Eastern Front. German junior officers, to include the grade of Colonel, are selected from the ranks. Under the Nazi system these officers are very close to their men. German character is not addicted to revolution. Were a peace to come on the Eastern Front, the possibility that it will be orderly with the Army in firm control and able to shift its strength to the West, must be faced.

A separate peace, under control of the Army precludes the possibility of an Anglo-American major invasion of Europe.

Conceivably with a strong new government Germany might invade Spain in an attempt to cut off our Mediterranean forces.

The withdrawal of the German Army from the East and the overthrow of Hitler, conceivably might end in a Red Revolution.

Whether or not a separate peace leads to violence or is orderly, Soviet influence will be far greater than that of the United States and Great Britain. Anxious to create a strong Germany so as to bulwark Europe against Communism, Great Britain would probably hasten to make peace. Unable to control the situation, the United States would be forced to follow Britain.

Counter-measures for the U.S.S.R.

Because of the grave implications of the Moscow Manifesto, the United Nations should again attempt to engage Stalin in forthright conversations.** Certain pressures and inducements can be offered the Soviets to continue their magnificent effort.

Pressures:

Loss of Lend-Lease would be a deadly blow.

Proposal of an Anglo-American Balkan campaign would interfere with Soviet plans for this area.

Threats of peace with Japan which permit Japanese control of Manchuria and the Sea of Japan would be most disturbing.

* France hopes for the Rhineland; Poland wants Danzig and East Prussia; Czechoslovakia desires to be reconstituted and expand.
**For more than a month Ambassador Stanley has been unable to secure an appointment with Stalin; ~~Maximilian~~ President Roosevelt has repeatedly sought a personal conference; he offered to meet Stalin in Teheran. After Casablanca, General Marshall contemplated a trip to Moscow, but was advised that unless he had urgent military plans to propose the trip would not be worthwhile. Stalin has no Ambassadors in Washington and London.

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Inducements:

Point out that a just and lasting peace can be achieved in 1944 if only the United Nations remain united.

Continue Lend-lease.

Give Stalin full participation in the Italian Armistice.

Promise ever increasingly heavy bombardment of Germany.

Promise him his proper role in the European peace.

Pledge to eliminate the Japanese menace.

Promise post war assistance in rehabilitation, especially medical and technical assistance.

Promise to assume our full responsibility for maintenance of peace.

Promise a prompt, reasonable solution to Stalin's demands for new Balkan and Central European frontiers.

Counter-measures for Germany.

After attempting forthright conversations, if Stalin continues to remain noncommittal, of necessity we must be prepared on a moment's notice to present to Germany counter-measures to offset Stalin's Armistice and peace proposals.

Explain that Unconditional Surrender applies to Hitler and his gangsters.

Offer security and justice to the conservative westward looking elements of Germany.

Pledge no vengeance except to war criminals who have been duly tried and found guilty.

Promise Germany peace with honor, 1919 territorial integrity, security, food, the right to choose a liberal government, assistance in rehabilitation, protection from vengeance of her European neighbors and the Soviets.

~~Because of the almost universal fear throughout Europe of Soviet domination, align all peoples, including the German, against the Soviets.~~

Conclusions:

That a separate peace is a possibility.

That a separate peace on the Eastern Front will lead to negotiated peace in the West.

- 4 -
That in the event of a separate peace, an independent Germany might be advantageous to the United States.

That the U.S.S.R. has offered Germany more attractive terms than can the United Nations.

That the United States should be prepared to shift the weight of her effort to the Pacific.

6 August 1943.

SECRET

ATTEMPT TO ESTIMATE THE SITUATION

24 JULY 1941

There are two wars. A war to the finish in the Pacific; a political war in Europe. These two wars have superimposed themselves upon a World in Revolution.

The Pacific war is Racial.

The European war is Social.

In both wars alignments are confused.

Japan fights to dominate Asia and free it from Occidental influence.

China fights to live. She also seeks to free Asia from the white man, but would have Asiatic states independent.

Germany fought to dominate Europe; now she maneuvers to stave off defeat.

The U.S.S.R. fought to survive; now she maneuvers to dominate Europe.

Great Britain declared war because she believed that were Germany victorious, her Empire would not be worth a nickel.

In the Pacific the United States fights because she was attacked; in Europe because we have maneuvered ourselves into believing our destiny is inextricably linked with the British Empire.

In the European war all belligerents claim social betterment their objective; each protests his side has the better medicines.

In all battle and occupied areas this war has brought complete devastation. Most of the populations are starving. Hatred is rampant. Desperation characterizes all acts. In the world's history there has never before existed such bewildered disillusionment.

The war is not progressing as well as censorship and propaganda picture.

Chiang Kai-shek's new book pleads for Nationalism; denounces Japanese war lords rather than the Japanese people; demands that Asia be free. The book is not to be published in English possibly because it suggests an anti-white flavor. If the Burma campaign does not develop, Chiang will drift still

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further from the Allied camp.

Because of our continued failure to launch a Pacific offensive the disillusionment of the Filipinos is increasing.

American prisoners in the hands of the Japanese have died like flies. Of more than 20,000 possibly only a few thousand remain. Governors of states are asking about their troops who were taken prisoners. Some day when the people learn, an accounting will be asked. It will be difficult to show what steps were taken to rescue those men on Batan and later in the prison camp death traps of Tarlac and Formosa.

The Moscow Manifesto published in Pravda (20 July) and the Daily Worker (21 July) means that the U.S.S.R. and Germany are unlikely to fight to a finish. Were Germany to negotiate with the Soviets, our demands for our unconditional surrender cannot be achieved.

German leaders may somehow dispose of Hitler, maneuver themselves so as to constitute the European bulwark against the Soviet menace. On the other hand, although Germany is not addicted to Civil War, she may succumb to Communism, and the war as the Red Revolution ended the war in 1917.

Britain is concerned. She has some 5,000 Americans sampling American opinion; outwardly the reason is to determine what she may expect from us in the way of post-war cooperation. Logically the survey is also to gauge the 1944 elections. Britain would have a fourth term; failing in this she must have a President who will support her policy.

Soon we may expect Churchill and his 80 assistants for another Washington conference. He will probably propose:

- (1) To force Turkey into the war;
- (2) To invade the Balkans, not so much to destroy Germany as to preclude Soviet occupation of the Balkans;
- (3) To postpone a Pacific offensive until Europe quiets.

Before Stalingrad, an Allied invasion of the Balkans might have been acceptable to Stalin. But now conceivably it may lead to trouble.

Of all the belligerents, only the United States has under-written unconditional surrender in both wars. But we have done more. With the gravest possible war commitments, we have undertaken heavier production programs than those of our Allies.

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Through Lend-Lease we transfuse our Allies with food and munitions. Although when the war began our larder was empty and food was being imported, without increased production, we are lend-leasing vast food surpluses. In June Lend-Lease values reached a billion dollars.

The U.S.S.R. has no foreign forced labor, but women work the same as men; the receipt of heavy Lend-Lease shipments bolsters Stalin's industry and agriculture. Britain has no forced labor, but she also receives very heavy Lend-Lease shipments. Germany has a forced laborer for every one of her some eight million in uniform. German women work almost as well as Russian. Japan has all the manpower of the Orient at her disposal; all her women work. She has raw material; she needs only time.

The United States has no extra labor to replace men in the service; our women work but not in proportion to those of our enemies. We receive no industrial help, rather we lend it.

We must build the ships to deliver material to our Allies. Our troops must travel 4,000 miles east, 8,000 miles west to find anyone to fight. Even British Empire lines of communication are shorter than ours. Germany and the U.S.S.R. fight on their own frontiers. Japan's main positions are in her Empire proper and in North China. Her longest supply line is 4,000 miles.

In spite of all these disadvantages the talent and genius peculiar to America will win both wars. But we must be allowed to win them the American way, our action must be pitched to American tempo. Distances force us more and more into the air and fortunately for us this is an air war. And American industry and American youth can build more and better aircraft and fly them better than anyone else in the world.

The United States has serious racial, economic, social problems on the Home Front. Our borrowing is enormous, beyond comprehension. We are making tragic inroads on our raw materials. One need not be especially astute to see that for us the war must end as quickly as possible. The war can be won quickly only if the United States assumes direction of the war.

Conclusions

1. That the war in Europe is purely political.
2. That Germany and the U.S.S.R. will probably negotiate a peace.
3. That we should hold chaotic Europe from Britain and the Mediterranean and shift the weight of our effort to the Pacific.
4. That the American Home Front demands a quick war.
5. That to win the war quickly the United States must assume direction of the war.

SECRET**SECRET****ANALYZE THE SITUATION****2 JULY 1944****1. Over-all Strategy**

The United States must successfully conclude this war at the earliest possible date. Dangers involved in unnecessarily prolonging the war are: disruption of our home front; dissipation of American resources; collapse of European civilization; world-wide intensification of racial differences.

To win the war there must be an over-all plan fitted closely into a time schedule. This plan must have only one objective: **WIN NOW**. Today we are following the method of trial and error, wait and see, marking time with half-offensives in the hope that Germany and the U.S.S.R. will bleed one another white and that Japan's collapse will be a natural consequence after Germany surrenders.

Trooping with indecisive objectives about the periphery of Europe will neither win the war nor free our strength to strike Japan. We are following British strategy blindly. Each British proposal relates to the Mediterranean. Each tends not to defeat Hitler but rather enhances the strength and security of the British Empire against present German or future Russian threats.

The only hope for a victory in Europe in 1943 faded when Churchill, at the recent Washington conference, refused flatly to use British troops for invasion. Stalin is not satisfied with an Anglo-American promise for invasion next year. Such delayed action would preclude delivery of our full force against Japan until 1945. This delay would permit Japan to become immeasurably strong and would be ruinous to the American people.

The British would have us pour American strength into England and Africa there to await political developments, the results of bombing, and the Nazi-Soviet struggle. After a peace in Europe is achieved, the British, lending some assistance, would then permit us to fight Japan while they recuperate and consolidate their vast World War II empire.

2. Direction of the War

Our association with our Soviet allies must of necessity be remote. With the British our cooperation is much more

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intimate. When the Allied peak of power is reached in the European Theater, American forces will be roughly twice as strong as those of the British. In the Orient our relative strength will be even greater. Through Lend-Lease we are furnishing our Allies vastly more equipment than are the British. Neither by demonstrated military leadership nor on the basis of contribution to the war effort is British direction of the war justifiable.

3. American Military Independence

In all theaters our forces should fight as independent American units. Cooperation with our Allies is, of course, essential. However, American units must preserve their entity. The fact that the combined British, American, and French armies won a victory in Tunisia does not warrant continued intermingling of American personnel and units with those of our Allies. Any team looks good when it is winning. American tempo, genius for production, and indomitable spirit can only be characteristically American if given complete freedom to do things the American way.

To the British this war is a political instrument to further their national interests. To the American the war is a dirty job which must be finished as quickly as possible. The talent and genius which is peculiar to Americans must not be deadened by combining our forces with those of our Allies. Our individuality must be maintained.

4. European Theater

In this theater Germany occupies a huge position in readiness. She will dispute a landing anywhere on the continent. The cost of a successful landing would be prohibitive in lives, equipment. It must not be attempted until Germany is very soft.

On the Eastern Front, two hundred two German divisions threaten three hundred Russian. Stalin knows and German intelligence probably knows there will be no major invasion of Europe this year. But Germany knows more. She knows the Allies will be in a position to invade next year.

To avoid fighting on two fronts in 1944, therefore, Germany must dispose of the Red Army without delay. We have not been given sufficient data on which to base an evaluation of the Red Army. Hitler himself believes that he can gain a decision this year. The opinion of his General Staff is not known. Regardless of the outcome, a deadlock in the European Theater appears likely.

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The fact that conversations between the German and Soviet officials have taken place in Stockholm lends weight to the idea of a separate peace. There also appears to have been conversations between British and German representatives in Madrid. Anglo-American planning must include the possibility of a German-Russian peace before the Spring of 1944.

5. Asiatic Theater

Since Pearl Harbor, Japan has conquered a vast empire comparable in natural resources to the combined holdings of the United States and Great Britain. She is consolidating her gains, fortifying her new possessions. She is bending all her energies to strengthen her outer defenses which extend from the Aleutians, along Siberia, Asia, through Malaya, and in to the East Indies. At key points defensive works are being constructed and garrisoned. Scores of airfields and naval bases are being constructed so that Japan can shift her air and sea power rapidly along her entire front. Although today the Japanese military machine is loosely knit, over extended, and unbalanced, tomorrow it will be formidable.

We are committed to the defeat of Germany before launching an all-out decisive offensive against Japan. Yet we have postponed such an offensive until 1944. Only those guilty of wishful thinking believe we can defeat Germany in time to strike in the Orient before Japan has become a first-class power.

6. Unified Command

In the Pacific the command of the United Nations' forces must be unified so that the British, the Chinese, and the combined American forces can operate as a team. Although the area of East Asia and the islands of the Pacific is enormous, United Nations' forces in the various theaters of command are all fighting Japan. Coordination of their efforts is essential.

Japan has constructed a series of air and naval bases extending from the Aleutians to the Solomons. So long as we attack piecemeal, Japan can shift her forces to resist the weight of our blows. However, should we attack simultaneously at widely separated, vital points, the enormity of the operation will prevent Japan's effective maneuver of her reserves. She is not strong enough to meet determined simultaneous attacks at widely separated points along her extended front.

7. War Aims

To fight well, American soldiers must have a cause. In

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the Pacific our cause is clear, just, and element. In the European and African Theaters the issues are confused by political complications and manipulations. The United Nations cannot announce their war aims because certain aims are conflicting and certain others are conflicting. Unless we announce our war aims now, while our Allies are dependent upon us, our idealism will be submerged at the peace table.

Because of its inseparable relationship with the British, the Administration cannot have a foreign policy. But war aims could be embodied in the foreign policy of the Senate. Certain principles could be announced now indicative of America's minimum peace demands.

Certain minimum peace requirements come to mind at once:

- (1) Avoid shaping an immediate peace.
- (2) In each war torn country hold the post-war administration in the hands of our military until conditions insuring a just peace are indicated.
- (3) Avoid reinstatement of defunct politicians whose pre-war incompetence contributed to the war pressures.
- (4) Select as temporary local leaders young patriots whose reputations lie ahead not behind them, who are free from bias and who have to offer their people a quarter century of unselfish service.
- (5) Use the period of Military Administration to bring to light injustices and revenge motives so that they may be eliminated from the peace.
- (6) Offer all subject people the opportunity to earn their independence. The American experiment in the Philippines furnishes the model toward which to shape political and economic programs.

Until war aims are clarified, the morale of our troops in the European and African Theaters cannot be as high as that of our men in the Pacific.

8. Home Front

Conditions on our Home Front are growing steadily worse. The battle on the Home Front could be lost. No solid framework has been created on which to hang the war effort. There are racial troubles. The farm and food situations are acute. Factory and mine production are on the wane. The mines in the West will produce in 1944 twenty to thirty per cent less than

replaced. Production is down because of labor shortages and difficulties.

Germany has ten per cent of her population in uniform, but this ten per cent loss on the Home Front is largely replaced by foreign labor. In the United States we have eight per cent of our population in uniform but no replacements have been received from without. Germany has only her own forces to maintain; the fronts are adjacent to the Fatherland. The United States, however, is maintaining fronts all over the world and at the same time sending vast quantities of stores and military equipment to our Allies.

Long ago Germany failed in her blitzkrieg. Now she has organized for a war of extermination by attrition. Japan also is planning for a long war. Consequently the American Home Front is fully as important as is the battle front.

Including preliminary events, the war has never been presented honestly to the American people. Never before have we been fooled for so long a period; we can't be fooled much longer.

Although most of our people have lost faith in Washington, all still believe in our military leadership. When they learn how little progress is possible under British direction of the war their reaction will be violent.

Possibly the Home Front is not a primary concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but our Military Affairs Committees of Congress must of necessity concern themselves with it.

CONCLUSIONS

1. That the United Nations have no sound plan to bring the war to a prompt, successful termination.
2. That the United States must assume direction of the war.
3. That the American effort should retain its independence and individuality.
4. That a separate German-Russian peace is a possibility.
5. That the Pacific Command must be unified.
6. That time works for Japan.
7. That we should shift the weight of our war effort to the Pacific.
8. That American war aims should be announced.
9. That the Home Front must be strengthened.

Dear Colonel Buxton:

These
are the notes of which I
spoke to you at lunch
today. Please keep in
mind this is a personal
point of view & I'm a
pessimist.

Wm. J. Felt

2 Aug 1943

ANNEX II

The Moscow Manifesto is a slick document. Whether implemented or repudiated, it must be considered as a Stalin peace gesture.

A separate peace by U.S.S.R. is possible.

Soviet losses may have reached twenty five million, one third of which were soldiers.

Russians are war weary, psychologically ripe for peace.

The Soviet food and industrial situation is critical.

A separate peace would foster Soviet influence in central Europe and the Balkans.

Carpathian frontiers would put Stalin in position to control Romanian oil.

The U.S.S.R. hopes to overshadow Anglo-American influence in Europe.

Stalin may feel justified in making a separate peace because pledges for a 1943 invasion made after Casablanca were repudiated at the last Washington conference.

Aspects of Moscow Manifesto favorable to Germany are:

Strength from Eastern Front is needed ^{meet the} to ever increasing Anglo-American pressure in the West and South, ^{to} replace Italian units in France and the Balkans.

Peace on Eastern Front would offset blow dealt German morale by the unexpected and sudden fall of Mussolini.

Mussolini's failure placed heavy stress on Hitler's position; were Hitler to be replaced his successor would be free to deal with Stalin.

retaliatory measures, continuation of Eastern Front means eventual German defeat and dismemberment.

Because of the grave implications of the Moscow Manifesto, the United Nations should immediately engage Stalin in forthright conversations. We can offer certain pressures and inducements in the hope that the Soviets will continue their magnificent war effort.

Pressures:

Lend-Lease, especially food, is essential to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, peace as proposed in the Moscow Manifesto would return the Ukraine.

Threat of an Anglo-American Balkan campaign would be contrary to Soviet ambition in this area. In no event can we offer Stalin a free hand because of our pledges to Yugoslavia and Greece. Germany's main interests however lie north of the Danube; she would not interfere with Soviet policy south of the Danube.

The United States can apply pressure on the Soviet Union by threats of a peace with Japan which permits the Japanese control over the sea of Japan and Manchuria.

Inducements:

United Nations can offer the U.S.S.R. free outlet through the Baltic, Aegean, and Japanese seas.

We can invite Stalin to take full share participation in the Italian Armistice and promise him ^{his} just place in establishing an European peace such that the Soviet frontier will not be threatened.

We can promise elimination of the Japanese menace to the U.S.S.R.

We can continue Lend-Lease.

Although we cannot honestly promise invasion from England for some time to come, our continued and increasing pressure on Germany and denial to her of

After these forthright and forceful conversations, if Stalin remains adamant, of necessity we must propose counter-measures.

General Eisenhower could explain that unconditional surrender applies only to Hitler and his Nazi gangsters.

We could promise Germany a new liberal government, peace with honor, food, 1918 territorial integrity, punishment of those responsible for the war but amnesty for the German people.

As military measures we can continue bombing and deny Germany Hermann Goerr.

Because of our pledges to oppressed peoples, the United Nations cannot offer Germany the liberal terms implied in the Moscow Manifesto. France hopes for the Rhineland; Poland wants Danzig and East Prussia; Czechoslovakia desires to be reconstituted and expand.

The military and political implications of a separate peace suggest far-reaching consequences. Once the peace were effected an Anglo-American invasion would be impossible. Anxious to stem the sweep of Soviet control over Europe, Great Britain would probably want Germany strong so as to bulwark Europe against Communism. The United States, unable to control the situation, would be forced to follow Britain.

A separate peace with the U.S.S.R. would threaten our position in the Mediterranean. With 200 German Divisions released in the East, Germany might invade Spain in an effort to cut off United Nations forces.

Conclusions:

That the U.S.S.R. has and can afford to offer Germany more favorable terms than can the United Nations;

That in the event of a separate peace it is to
the United Nations' interest to negotiate a peace in
order again to use Germany as a buffer state;

That the United States must be prepared to shift
the weight of her effort to the Pacific.

Tolson, J. Edgar

Dear Mr. Boardman:

Have no written, then

draft. New paragraphs are marked in red.

Respectfully,

John F. Kennedy

10 Aug 1943

the Russian proposals to Germany for an armistice and peace.

2.

THE RUSSIAN MANIFESTO

a. The 1943 German Manifesto

On 21 July 1943, Goebbels published a manifesto to the German people which called for immediate action. Goebbels at once and the German Army was called upon to overthrow the Hitler government, to cease military operations, to recall the German troops to the Reich Frontiers, to embark on peace negotiations and renounce all conquests.

b. Psychological Warfare and Strategic Warfare

In itself the manifesto is merely a superior and brilliant stroke of Russian psychological warfare. However careful examination discloses that in reality it is a revealing link in a series of successively clever steps designed to terminate the Nazi-Soviet war. As a document, the manifesto presents the greatest possible challenge to Anglo-American psychological warfare resourcefulness; as part of a plan which might end the war, it demands the immediate attention of highest authority.

SUCCESSIVE

3.

LIST OF EVENTS RELATED TO THE MANIFESTO

1. 7 November 1942 and again on 23 February 1943 Stalin claimed the aim of the Soviet Union was not the destruction of the German nation or even the dissolution of the German Army.
2. Stalin never endorsed specifically the Casablanca Unconditional Surrender pronouncement.
3. The minutes of the last Washington conference, were sent to Stalin. They disclosed that no invasion of Europe - except possibly Italy - was contemplated in 1943. Stalin

Provide published an article claiming the United States and Great Britain had broken faith with the U.S.S.R. in that they promised a 1945 invasion from England into France, which they later repudiated.

g. Stalin has repeatedly refused to meet with Churchill and Roosevelt for discussion of war and post-war plans.

f. There are no Soviet Ambassadors in Washington and London.

g. Ambassador Gromyko is said to have advised the South American Labor Congress, which recently met in Havana, not to tie too closely to the United Nations for in the near future important developments were anticipated.

4. GERMAN MILITARY POSITION.

1. It is becoming increasingly clear that Germany must effect an armistice, at least on the Eastern Front, or be destroyed.

5. ASPECTS OF A SEPARATE PEACE FAVORABLE TO THE U.S.S.R.

a. Soviet losses may have reached twenty five million, one third of which were soldiers.

b. Russians are war weary, psychologically ripe for peace.

c. The Soviet food and industrial situation is critical.

d. A separate peace would foster Soviet influence in central Europe and the Balkans.

e. Carpathian frontiers would put Stalin in position to control Romanian oil; the fertile Ukraine would be returned.

f. The U.S.S.R. resents Anglo-American interference in central Europe.

g. Stalin may feel justified in making a separate peace because Anglo-American pledges for a 1943 major invasion were repudiated at the last Washington conference.

9. Recently reports from South France claim French Communists have been instructed to advocate a separate peace between Russia & Germany because of the broken Anglo-American pledge.

ADVANTAGES OF A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

a. Strength from the Eastern Front is needed to meet the over-increasing Anglo-American pressure and to replace Italian units in France and the Balkans.

b. Peace with U.S.S.R. would affect the high level German morale by the unexpected fall of Mussolini which placed heavy stress on Hitler's position.

c. German peace-time economy complements that of the U.S.S.R.

d. Although Germany is still capable of terrific retaliatory measures, continuation of Eastern Front needs eventual German defeat and dismemberment.

CONSEQUENCES OF A SEPARATE PEACE

a. The danger in the Moscow manifesto lies in the fact that its terms are more attractive than those yet offered by the United Nations. We have demanded unconditional surrender; we have made promises to oppressed peoples. *

b. Peace with the U. S.S.R. would release 200 German Divisions from the Eastern Front. German junior officers, to include the grade of Colonel, are selected from the ranks. Under the Nazi system these officers are very close to their men. German character is not addicted to revolution. Were a peace to come on the Eastern Front, the possibility that it will be orderly with the Army in firm control and able to shift its strength to the West, ~~is~~ must be faced.

c. France hopes for the Rhineland; Poland wants Danzig and East Prussia; Czechoslovakia desires to be re-constituted and expand.

character is not addicted to revolution. Here a peace is tant to the Eastern Front, the possibility that it will be orderly with the Army in firm control and able to shift its strength to the West, must be faced.

2. A separate peace, under control of the Army, precludes the possibility of an Anglo-American major invasion of Europe.

3. Conceivably with a strong new government, Germany might invade Spain in an attempt to cut off our Mediterranean forces.

4. The withdrawal of the German Army from the East and the overthrow of Hitler, conceivably might end in a Red Revolution.

5. Whether or not a separate peace leads to violence or is orderly, Soviet influence will be far greater than that of the United States and Great Britain. Anxious to create a strong Germany so as to bulwark Europe against Communism, Great Britain would probably hasten to make peace. Unable to control the situation, the United States would be forced to follow Britain.

6. CONCRETE MEASURES FOR THE FUTURE

a. Because of the grave implications of the Moscow Manifesto, the United Nations should again attempt to engage Stalin in forthright conversations. Certain pressures and inducements can be offered the Soviets to continue their magnificent effort.

b. Preserves:

(1) Loss of Lend-Lease would be a deadly blow.

c. It appears Great Britain has already achieved most of her war objectives. She has complete control of the Mediterranean; most of Africa will be under her domination; in India a force of one million well equipped natives serves her; Britain's air power is enormous; fleet and merchant vessel losses are being replaced; she has lost far less and gained more than her European rivals. Losses in the Far East can be replaced by treaty.

So far more than a youth Ambassador Stanley has been unable to secure an appointment with Stalin; President Roosevelt has repeatedly sought a personal conference; he offered to meet Stalin in Tehran. After Casablanca, General Marshall contemplated a trip to Moscow, but was advised that unless he had urgent military plans to propose the trip would not be worthwhile. Stalin has no Ambassadors in Washington and London.

as control of Manchuria and the Soviet Japan could be most disturbing.
 8. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

- (1) Point out that a just and lasting peace can be achieved in 1944 if only the United Nations remain united.
- (2) Continue Lend-Lease.
- (3) Give Stalin full participation in the Italian Armistice.
- (4) Promise ever increasingly heavy bombardment of Germany.
- (5) Promise him his proper role in the European peace.
- (6) Pledge to eliminate the Japanese menace.
- (7) Promise post war assistance in rehabilitation, especially medical and technical assistance.
- (8) Promise to assume our full responsibility for maintenance of peace.
- (9) Promise a prompt, reasonable solution to Stalin's demands for new Balkan and Central European frontiers.

9. COUNTER-MEASURES FOR GERMANY

- a. After attempting forthright conversations, if Stalin continues to remain noncommittal, of necessity we must be prepared on a moment's notice to present to Germany counter-measures to offset Stalin's Armistice and peace proposals.
- b. Explain that Unconditional Surrender applies to Hitler and his gangsters.
- c. Offer security and justice to the conservative westward looking elements of Germany.
- d. Pledge no vengeance except to war criminals who have been duly tried and found guilty.
- e. Promise Germany peace with honor, 1936 territorial integrity, food, the right to choose their own liberal government, assistance in rehabilitation, protection from vengeance of her European neighbors, and the Soviets.

As an overall counter measure to the effective psychological warfare program being waged by Stalin, Great Britain and the United States should announce their ~~own~~ ~~minimum~~ ~~requirements~~. We should seek minimum requirements for a just peace.

- a. Avoid shaping an immediate peace.
- b. In each war torn country hold the post-war administration in the hands of our military until conditions insuring a just peace are indicated.
- c. Avoid reinstatement of defunct politicians whose pre-war incompetence contributed to the war pressures.
- d. Select as temporary local leaders young patriots whose reputations lie ahead not behind them, who are free from bias and who have to offer their people a quarter century of unselfish service.
- e. Use the period of Military Administration to bring to light injustices and revenge motives so that they may be eliminated from the peace.
- f. Pledge all subject people the opportunity to earn their independence. The Philippines furnishes the model toward which to shape political and economic programs.

CONCLUSIONS

- a. That a separate peace is a possibility.
- b. That a separate peace on the Eastern Front will lead to negotiated peace.
- c. That in the event of a separate peace, an independent Germany might be advantageous to the United States.
- d. That the U.S.S.R. has offered Germany more attractive terms than can the United Nations.
- e. That the United States should be prepared to occupy Europe and shift her offensive weight to the Pacific.

10 August 1945

Dear General Donohue:

Since

learning you are going
away I thought you
might be interested in
this draft which I shall
present to the Planning
Group.

Respectfully
Forner

August 7 1943